O presente trabalho tem como objetivo principal mostrar quem foram os subdiáconos da Igreja Católica Apostólica Romana, a época em que eles existiram e assumiram algumas funções bem definidas, cuja característica primeira era a de não sobrepor às funções do diácono, o qual, de fato, é um ministro ordenado e recebe o primeiro sacramento da ordem, no grau do diaconato. Este artigo surgiu após diversas indagações de fiéis interessados na celebração da missa, no usus antiquior (forma extraordinária) do Rito Latino (...) e na súbita inexistência da ordem do subdiácono, atualmente fora dos círculos tradicionalistas, que obtiveram permissão para manter este grau da ordem. Apesar de ser uma ordem maior, o subdiaconato não é um sacramento, segundo os preceitos da Santa Sé Apostólica. O autor deste artigo dará algumas respostas para as seguintes questões: e agora como fazer? Quem pode substituir o subdiácono, uma vez que o usus antiquior foi restabelecido? O que este substituto pode fazer e o que ele não pode? (shrink)

Neste artigo interessa-nos abordar alguns aspectos sobre a relação entre a Sagrada Escritura e a Liturgia, de modo particular aqueles elementos concernentes à reorganização e confecção levadas a cabo pela reforma litúrgica do concílio Vaticano II do livro litúrgico que contém as perícopes bíblicas lidas na liturgia da Palavra durante as celebrações eucarísticas, isto é, o Lecionário da Missa. Para esta abordagem, nos servirá, em grande medida, o relato sobre os trabalhos da Reforma Litúrgica - relato este ainda inédito no (...) Brasil - escrito por D. Annibale Bugnini, Secretário do Consilium, a comissão encarregada para a aplicação dos princípios de reforma estipulados pela Constituição Sacrosanctum Concilium. (shrink)

O grupo de escritos chamados Cartas Católicas, junto à chamada Carta aos Hebreus apresenta-se como um testemunho extra-paulino do Cristianismo primitivo. De fato, é o conjunto dos textos narrativos (Evangelhos e Atos) e do Corpus Paulinum (conjunto dos escritos atribuídos a Paulo) que são mais marcantes na compreensão do Evento Jesus Cristo e sua vivência e compreensão no primeiro século. Com frequência, se esquece que o Cristianismo é um fenômeno histórico e social plural. Uma pequena introdução a este tempo histórico (...) e à sua temática é sempre oportuna para compreender as raízes da Igreja. (shrink)

A pesquisa procura não só conceituar e expor a estética de Hegel, mas também elucidar seu pensamento referente à questão. Em suas palavras, estética seria o belo artístico, criado pelo homem. Nesse sentido, a ascendência da arte está na precisão que o homem tem de objetivar seu espírito, morfosiando o mundo e também se transformando. Assim, nas páginas que se seguem há uma exposição do conceito vulgar de estética em contraponto a visão hegeliana, para tanto, o filósofo cita a ascensão (...) e declínio do conceito de arte e estética buscando contextualizá-la enquanto função na história do homem. (shrink)

Using medical advances to enhance human athletic, aesthetic, and cognitive performance, rather than to treat disease, has been controversial. Little is known about physicians? experiences, views, and attitudes in this regard. We surveyed a national sample of physicians to determine how often they prescribe enhancements, their views on using medicine for enhancement, and whether they would be willing to prescribe a series of potential interventions that might be considered enhancements. We find that many physicians occasionally prescribe enhancements, but doctors hold (...) nuanced and ambiguous views of these issues. Most express concerns about the potential effects of enhancements on social equity, yet many also believe specific enhancements that are safe and effective should be available but not covered by insurance. These apparently contradictory views might reflect inherent tensions between the values of equity and liberty, which could make crafting coherent social policies on medical enhancements challenging. [Supplementary materials are available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of American Journal of Bioethics for the following free supplemental resource(s): An additional table (Table 5) referred to on p. 5]. (shrink)

Em seu livro recente, Engelmann (2021) avançou uma leitura do Tractatus que, a seu ver, removeria as dificuldades presentes em outras leituras (em particular, nas leituras “metafísica” e “resoluta”). Neste artigo, ocupar-me-ei da crítica de Engelmann às leituras metafísicas do Tractatus. Tal crítica baseia-se na ideia de que essas leituras estão comprometidas com algumas necessidades de re, o que violaria a autonomia da lógica e a ideia Tractariana segundo a qual só há necessidade lógica. Analisarei o caso particular de uma (...) suposta necessidade de re, a saber, a do número de objetos no mundo. Depois de descrever alguns aspectos positivos e alguns obstáculos à interpretação de Engelmann desse caso, sugerirei que Engelmann está inconscientemente atribuindo ao Tractatus uma concepção de lógica que Wittgenstein, por sua vez, criticamente atribuiu a Russell e a Ramsey e que, portanto, não pode ser a sua. Por fim, retornarei à motivação original para a interpretação de Engelmann, que é a de salvar a autonomia da lógica, mostrando de maneira breve como conciliar a autonomia da lógica com um número fixo de objetos.AbstractIn a recent book, Engelmann (2021) has put forward a reading of the Tractatus which he maintains would remove the difficulties presented in other readings, particularly the “metaphysical” and the “resolute” readings. In this paper, my concern will be with Engelmann’s criticism of the metaphysical readings of the Tractatus. This criticism is centered on the idea that such readings are committed to some de re necessities,which violates the autonomy of logic and the Tractarian idea that there is only logical necessity. I analyze the particular case of a supposed de re necessity, namely, the number of objects in the world. After describing some positive aspects and drawbacks of Engelmann’s interpretation of this case, I suggest that Engelmann is unconsciously attributing to the Tractatus a conception of logic that Wittgenstein in turncritically attributed to Russell and Ramsey; thus, this conception cannot be his own. Finally, I return to the original motivation for Engelmann’s interpretation, which is to save the autonomy of logic, and briefly show how to conciliate the autonomy of logic with a fixed number of objects. (shrink)

This commentary was suggested to me in part by a colleague's remark that it would be nice if we could make William James's The Varieties of Religious Experience "respectable." The implication was that though there was something redeemable about the book, it somehow wasn't philosophically or scientifically proper. The remark awakened me to—or at least reminded me of—the fact that this has been a traditional take on James's text. As Julius Bixler points out, ridicule began soon after the book was (...) published: "The Varieties of Religious Experience, appearing at about the same time as Ernest Thompson Seton's book of animal stories, was soon nicknamed 'Wild Religions I Have Known'" (1926, 1). My awakening to this attitude—a prevalent if not a pervasive one among contemporary intellectuals—led me to consider that it would be better, and crucially important to James himself, to keep James "unrespectable." James may have been a renegade and... (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, the aim is to demonstrate the ethical-semantic impact of great time in the reaccentuation of two reformulations of the expression “let this cup pass from me.” Theoretically, we describe great time as semantic sectors of existence which frame the possibilities of meaning actualized in speech genres and concrete utterances. Methodologically, the song Cálice by Chico Buarque and Gilberto Gil and the RAP Cálice by Criolo are dialogically disposed in relation to their context of production, to one (...) another and to the biblical narratives Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane and The Last Supper, which simultaneously convey status of utterance to the expression of which cup configures a metonym and fix the expression as an item of a cultural memory that we can now name Roman Catholic memory.1 The discussion shows that the transposition of this utterance from one semantic sector of existence to another alters the reflection and refraction processes of ideological signs through a game of memories. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to extend and replicate previously published results from a random probability sample of university faculty. The sample assessed reasons given for companion-animal guardianship and for belief in the beneficial health effects of owning pets. In this replication and extension design, these two non-random samples responded to the same questionnaire items as those addressed to university faculty. Results indicated that avoidance of loneliness was the most frequent reason for owning pets among both students and middle-aged (...) community members. This result is consistent with the view that animals provide social support and companionship to humans at various stages of the life cycle. Suggesting an emergent feature of the human-nonhuman animal bond, both groups selected, “the pet helps keep me active” as the second-most common reason. Older women reported a greater belief in the health-giving benefits of pet ownership than did younger persons or men. This belief may contribute to human benefits of pet ownership and requires further research. (shrink)

Much contemporary egalitarian theorizing is broadly divided between luck egalitarians, such as G. A. Cohen, Richard Arneson, and John Roemer, and relational egalitarians, such as John Rawls, Samuel Scheffler, Josh Cohen, and me. The two camps disagree about how to conceive of equality: as an equal distribution of non-relational goods among individuals, or as a kind of social relation between persons - an equality of authority, status, or standing.This disagreement generates a second, about when unequal distributions of non-relational goods are (...) unjust. Luck egalitarians claim that inequality is unjust when it is accidental: when it is caused by morally arbitrary factors such as circumstances of birth. Relational egalitarians claim that inequality is unjust when it disadvantages people: when it reflects, embodies, or causes inequality of authority, status, or standing. (shrink)

This book present interdisciplinary research in the social sciences and humanities by connecting seemingly disparate sources through a sensitivity to endangered human values. It links reflections on the contemporary relationship between art and technology in a post-modern context, seeing art in terms of crossing boundaries and exploring virtuality. It deals with the consequences of economics colonising other disciplines, in terms of the processes by which the social becomes the economic. Using Jantsch''s evolutionary paradigm, the concept of self-transcendence is seen as (...) crucial for the understanding of human beings and their social systems. Incorporating recent thinking from the natural sciences, the learning process can be conceived as the life and activity of all complex systems, including those once conceived as organisms, machines, cultures or economies. Without the societal embrace of scientific and technological development no collective or individual meaning can be assigned to the production of new knowledge. The book seeks to recognise the point where a collective learning process becomes the heart of productivity, and where the shift from the hegemony of material labour to immaterial labour becomes fundamental. The author brings new understandings of art, the social, and technology together, based on the idea that history is not a story told in separate physical, social and spiritual spaces and that the most fundamental problem of today is how to find some shared meaning in a fractured world. The author analyses, at a global level, the process of the co-production of scientific and social order, of culture and technology, of life sciences and economic and political regimes. It rightly identifies the rise of the role of knowledge and the move of capital into life sciences as a new stage in the history of capitalism: what we can qualify as cognitive capitalism or biocapitalism. In this new era of capitalism, what is being manufactured and sold are not just tangible and non-tangible goods, whose increasing importance, as the author shows, poses unsurmountable theoretical problems to the theoretical apparatus of economic science. The increasing mercantilisation of the world appears at the same time as a bio-power, i.e. a set of instruments creating and controlling different forms of life, forms of communication, standards of socialisation, education, the individual and collective imaginary, etc. More fundamentally, the encounter of life sciences and the information technology integrates and subjects the most essential mechanisms of biological and social reproduction to the logic of capital valorization. To understand the complexity of these changes and the ethical and philosophical questions that the development of technology and sciences poses to the future of mankind one must break through the disciplinary barriers delineating different disciplines in social sciences and those separating social sciences from natural sciences. Professor Matko Mestrovic manages to tackle this challenge not only because of his impressive and masterful knowledge of different disciplines in the social and natural sciences, but he does it also owing to his capacity for theoretical elaboration that allows him to lay the foundations of a new transdisciplinary paradigm. This is why his work can raise the awareness of the general public on two issues: on a global and profound vision of the challenges posed by the new millennium; and on the need for a radical theoretical innovation bringing into question the disciplinary certitudes in develop a social science able to better understand the movement and the ambiguity of history. - Carlo Vercellone, Universite de Paris 1, Pantheon-Sorbonne Mestrovic provides a unique insight into the often forgotten relation between economics on the one hand and arts and culture on the other, demonstrating that these adomains function as a total social facticity and not as separate, entirely independent elements thereof. In doing so he is dispelling the illusions about the disciplinary self-containdness of individual forms of knowledge and is relying on those paradigms of contemporary scientific thought whose aepistemiological programs are based on close cooperation and aopening up and not on the persuasion about one''s own positions and dispositions. - Prof. dr. Rade Kalanj, Redovni profesor na Odjelu za sociologiju. (shrink)

It's early evening, a Friday night in October, and I have hauled myself off the couch to make dinner for my son and me. It's just us; the more active cooks in our family are away and the house is quiet. I've spent all afternoon immersed in scholarly literature about the history of home economics, and I chuckle at the irony as I pour premade marinara sauce over the noodles. I call up my son from the basement, where he's been (...) immersed in his own studies, and find myself musing about our beginnings together—that spring when he arrived twenty-three years ago just as the trees were beginning to bud. I mutter about how perplexing cooking and mothering have been for me, and realize that these glimpses of me as a young mother and ponderings of how to take up increasing responsibilities as a middle-aged Indigenous “academic auntie” bookend my seasons of Indigenous feminist growth. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of “the look” has generally been understood as an argument for the impossibility of mutual recognition between consciousnesses. Being-looked-at reveals me as an object for the other, but I can never grasp this object that I am. I argue here that the chapter “The Look” in Being and Nothingness has been widely misunderstood, causing many to dismiss Sartre’s view unfairly. Like Hegel’s account of recognition, Sartre’s “look” is meant as a theory of successful mutual recognition that proves (...) the existence of others. Yet Sartre claims that such an account is plausible only if recognition is affective, not cognitive. Situating Sartre’s account of the look within his technical understanding of affect’s distinctness from cognition not only enables a better understanding of Sartre’s view, but also reveals a compelling alternative to the understanding of self-other relations in contemporary affect theory. (shrink)

Much philosophical effort has been exerted over problems having to do with the correct analysis and application of the concept of epistemic justification. While I do not wish to dispute the central place of this problem in contemporary epistemology, it seems to me that there is a general neglect of the belief condition for knowledge. In this paper I offer an analysis of 'degrees of belief' in terms of a quality I label 'conviction', go on to argue that one requires (...) more conviction in a proposition in order to know it than to merely believe it, and conclude by suggesting that some current epistemological issues admit of new insight when we begin taking conviction seriously. (shrink)

in 2004, Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin created a bit of a firestorm when they attacked a sacred cow of contemporary pragmatism. At a meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Talisse and Aikin presented a paper in which they argued that pragmatists cannot be pluralists. A number of papers then appeared in the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, responding to Talisse and Aikin. Some of the responses were quite hostile, such as the paper “You (...) Talking to Me?” co-written by Michael Sullivan and John Lysaker. Others were more measured and reasoned, such as Cheryl Misak’s paper “Pragmatism and Pluralism.” Like these others, I aim to show that Talisse and Aikin are mistaken. However, I do think that Talisse and Aikin have presented an important challenge to pragmatists, and that pragmatists have at times perhaps endorsed pluralism a bit unreflectively. Thus, I think it is important for those of us who care about the pragmatist tradition to occasionally return to, consider, and critically engage what these authors have to say. (shrink)

This well-known passage refers to the growth of latifundia, a symptom of Rome's decadence. In v. 170 ignotis is generally taken to mean ‘unknown to the owners,’ and thus, it seems to me, the point of the passage is missed. There is a double antithesis; longa is contrasted with breuίa, parua, and ίgnotίs with notίs, ίnlustrίbus, or the like. The latter antithesis is implied in Camίllί, Curίorum; the other is left to be understood. In the good old days farms were (...) small, but were cultivated by the most eminent citizens, men like Camillus and Curius Dentatus; now these small farms are combined to form latίfundίa, managed by nobodies , whether slaves or tenant farmers. The juxta-position of longa and sub ίgnotίs is intentional. (shrink)

Hosius and others have suspected v. 87 on the ground that it is omitted by most of the good MSS. But the omission, as Weber saw, is due to the similar endings of vv. 86–87. It is difficult to see how a student of Lucan could convince himself that any other person is the author of v. 87, which not only improves the passage, but is wholly in keeping with the gloomy fatalism of Pompey as represented by Lucan in many (...) other places. Francken's objection that the emphatic me should have a pronoun contrasted with it may be sufficiently answered by a reference to vv. 396–398 of the same book; many instances from other authors could be added. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:26. IN DEFENSE OF SECTION V: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR YOLTON Professor Yolton's article is especially valuable for its opening paragraphs on the writing done in the eighteenth century on the physiological basis of cognition. These provide a much-needed background to Hume's own remarks on the nature of perceptions.. It is both correct and helpful, I think, to understand any philosopher as a man of his own century. Professor (...) Yolton offers this article, in part at least, to differ with my interpretation given in "The Location, Extension, Shape, and Size of Hume's Perceptions." It seems to me, however, that this opening part of his article serves instead to lend support to mine. I have not said, by the way, that Hume believes that ideas are "brain impressions," since Hume has not used that phrase himself. Instead, I have merely provided evidence that Hume believes some perceptions have location, extension, shape and size; and I have pointed out an inconsistency that arises in this connection. Professor Yolton warns against taking Hume to intend, in saying that an idea represents its impression, that the idea is an image of the impression. I find, however, that Hume does assert that ideas are images: Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions.... By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning.... (Tl) Again, in explaining memory: For what is the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of paet perceptions? And as an image necessarily resembles its object.... (T260) At the end of his Part I, Professor Yolton concludes: (1) Hume never mentions the brain and the physiological processes. It is the mind or the soul which considers, conceives, imagines, remembers, thinks It seems to me not at all clear that Hume distinguishes soul 27. or mind from the brain, for he says: Bodily pains and pleasures...arise Originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it.... (T276) And Hume certainly does describe the brain and its physiological processes on T60-61 and T185, as Professor Yolton himself later recognizes explicitly on his pages 12 and 16. An ambiguity arises regarding 'representation', Professor Yolton concludes, because Hume is writing in two languages in his account of ideas as representations : The difficulties of interpretation arise from Hume's application of quantitative terms to ideas - size, parts, divisibility. We have to balance this quantitative language of ideas by Hume's ascription of logical properties to ideas - truth, contradiction, possibility. When he speaks of ideas 'representing' things, to which language does 'representation' belong: to the quantitative or to the logical language? (6) I gather that Professor Yolton finds some sort of incompatibility between the "quantitative" characteristics of ideas and their "logical" ones; yet he offers no explanation why he finds them incompatible. More to the point, of course, is whether Hume himself regarded them as incompatible. I find he does not. Rather, it appears that it is the "quantitative" aspects of some ideas that permit them to be adequate representations, having the same "logical" properties as do objects. On T28 Hume has concluded that some ideas are very small: This however is certain, that we can form ideas, which shall be no greater than the smallest atom of the animal spirits of an insect a thousand times less than a mite.... Then on the following page he makes use of this conclusion to argue that ideas have the same "logical" properties as the objects they represent: Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations, contradictions and 28. agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects ; and this we may in general observe to be the foundation of all human knowledge. But our ideas are adequate representations of the most minute parts of extension; and thro' whatever divisions and subdivisions we may suppose these parts to be arriv'd at, they can never become inferior to some ideas, which we form. The plain consequence is, that whatever appca rn impossible and contradictory upon the comparison of these ideas, must be really impossible and contradictory, without any farther excuse or evasion. (T29), Thus I... (shrink)

This well-known passage refers to the growth of latifundia, a symptom of Rome's decadence. In v. 170 ignotis is generally taken to mean ‘unknown to the owners,’ and thus, it seems to me, the point of the passage is missed. There is a double antithesis; longa is contrasted with breuίa, parua, and ίgnotίs with notίs, ίnlustrίbus, or the like. The latter antithesis is implied in Camίllί, Curίorum; the other is left to be understood. In the good old days farms were (...) small, but were cultivated by the most eminent citizens, men like Camillus and Curius Dentatus; now these small farms are combined to form latίfundίa, managed by nobodies , whether slaves or tenant farmers. The juxta-position of longa and sub ίgnotίs is intentional. (shrink)

This well-known passage refers to the growth of latifundia, a symptom of Rome's decadence. In v. 170 ignotis is generally taken to mean ‘unknown to the owners,’ and thus, it seems to me, the point of the passage is missed. There is a double antithesis; longa is contrasted with breuίa, parua, and ίgnotίs with notίs, ίnlustrίbus, or the like. The latter antithesis is implied in Camίllί, Curίorum; the other is left to be understood. In the good old days farms were (...) small, but were cultivated by the most eminent citizens, men like Camillus and Curius Dentatus; now these small farms are combined to form latίfundίa, managed by nobodies, whether slaves or tenant farmers. The juxta-position of longa and sub ίgnotίs is intentional. (shrink)

I am very grateful for the thoughtful and illuminating comments of Linda Alcoff, Sharyn Clough, Marianne Janack, and Charles Mills on my Hypatia paper. Together, they raise several related questions about the status of value judgments and the roles they might legitimately play in scientific inquiry. Two common concerns relate to the proper scope of the legitimate use of value judgments in science, and whether there are significant differences between value judgments and factual judgments with respect to their revisability. Let (...) me take up these common questions first. (shrink)

In an often-quoted passage, Richard Rorty wrote that “J.S. Mill’s suggestion that governments devote themselves to optimizing the balance between leaving people’s lives alone and preventing suffering seems to me pretty much the last word.” In this article, I show why, for Rorty, maintaining a strong public-private divide that cordons off final vocabularies – the religious, racial, ethnic, sexual, gender, philosophical, and other terms so important for citizens’ private pursuits of self-creation and self-perfection – from public political discourse is a (...) crucial means to accomplishing both of these goals in post-secular liberal democracies. Public political justifications should instead be articulated in the foundation-neutral terms of a shared national vocabulary. Like paintbrushes and crowbars, final and shared vocabularies are different tools for different purposes, and a strong public-private divide helps ensure that no harm comes from their misuse. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in IndiaDan ArnoldBones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India. By Gregory Schopen. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997. Pp. xvii + 298.For over twenty years now, Gregory Schopen has prolifically been producing articles on the archaeology, epigraphy, and texts that pertain (...) to Indian Buddhist monasticism. Schopen's treatment of this material has been extremely insightful and original, and his work has been instrumental in overturning many of the cherished convictions that had long constituted the "received wisdom" of Buddhist studies. In particular, his articles have prompted significant revision in thought regarding the development of Mahāyāna and regarding the role of the monastic religious in Buddhist cultic life.With the publication of this collection of Schopen's essays, Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India (the first of two such volumes, according to the Preface by Donald Lopez), Schopen's work stands to receive a wider hearing, and so to extend its already significant influence in the field of Buddhist studies. This is as it should be; for all scholars in the field are very much in Schopen's debt for the illuminating interpretations and conclusions that he has distilled from monumental amounts of epigraphical data. While Schopen has devoted care to the edition, translation, and interpretation of manuscript remains from Gilgit (chiefly, the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins), his most characteristic and original interpretations have been of the kind of "donative inscriptions" attached to the material remains of Indian Buddhist cultic life—a task that requires, among other things, a rare expertise across the range of Middle Indic dialects. In deploying such expertise, Schopen has presented compelling evidence, for example, that it was in fact monks and nuns who sponsored the kinds of practices typically associated with the rise of Mahāyāna—a conclusion that counters the long-unchallenged view that it was Buddhist laypeople who initiated this movement. It would be good indeed if such conclusions, as well as the exemplary scholarship that warrants them, were to have influence in proportion to their originality and importance.Still, it must be said that the presentation of the essays collected in this volume also reveals one important problem, and it is to be hoped that this feature does not become entrenched as part of Schopen's influence. For particularly when reading these essays all at once, one is struck by the recurrent statement of a specious dichotomy between what religious people "actually did," and what canonical texts say they should have done. Overcorrecting the biases of his philological predecessors, Schopen insists on this dichotomy in a way, it seems to me, that reflects a problematic view of how canonical texts must have been used—a view according to [End Page 620] which, if attested behavior contradicts such texts, they must simply not have been used.The influential essay "Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman/Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of the Transference of Merit" (reprinted as chapter 2 of this volume) clearly exemplifies the pattern of Schopen's work. He starts by arguing (contra the presupposition of many of his predecessors) that there is little basis for taking the Pāli canon as reflecting anything like the state of practice at an early point in history. He then goes on to show (on the basis of donative inscriptions that are much more reliably datable indicators of what was happening on the ground) that, contrary to what the "canon" would lead us to expect, it was in fact chiefly monks and nuns who sponsored the production of cultic images. This evidence calls for the recognition that "from its first appearance in inscriptions, the Mahāyāna was a monk-dominated movement" (p. 32); that "not only was the image cult overwhelmingly a monastic concern, it was also, on the basis of the available information, a monastically initiated cult" (p. 32); and that, "All of... [the] monks [involved] were doctrinal specialists... (shrink)

Pamela Sue Anderson argues for an ethical vulnerability which “activates an openness to becoming changed” that “can make possible a relational accountability to one another on ethical matters”. In this essay I pursue Anderson’s solicitation that there is a positive politics to be developed from acknowledging and affirming vulnerability. I propose that this politics is one which has a specific relevance for animating the terms of feminist responses to sexual violence, something which has proved difficult for feminist theorists (...) and activists alike. I will demonstrate the contribution of Anderson’s work to such questions by examining the way in which “ethical vulnerability” as a framework can illuminate the intersectional feminist character of Tarana Burke’s grassroots Me Too movement when compared with the mainstream, viral version of the movement. I conclude by arguing that Anderson’s “ethical vulnerability” contains ontological insights which can allay both activist and academic concerns regarding how to respond to sexual violence. (shrink)

Este pequeno texto é uma singela homenagem que dedico para o meu exprofessor da graduação em Filosofia e meu orientador no mestrado em Ética e Epistemologia da UFPI. Trata-se de um texto rememorativo e de agradecimentos pela convivência e aprendizagem que tive com o professor Dr. José Sérgio D. da Fonseca. A grata oportunidade de conhecer o professor Dr. José Sérgio ocorreu-me por volta do ano 2009 em uma disciplina de seminário, na qual o professor José Sérgio ministrou um curso (...) sobre filosofia da mente, se minha memória não falha. (shrink)

Throughout the 1980s, the American right wing attempted to control the field of social politics and social policy through a rhetoric of `family'. In response, the left, including much of the lesbian and gay movement, abandoned an early, theorized antipathy to family, attempting to recapture the political field with ideas like `alternative families' and `families we chose'. These moves do not sufficiently account for the hidden glue that binds bodies to politics, national or anti-national. The glue, or, as Benedict (...) class='Hi'>Anderson calls it, `political love' is no longer an affect to be rejected but a `feeling' to be embraced. Examining the case of sexual abstinence in early right-wing AIDS discourse and in current websites, this article suggests that micro-politics of love are inextricable from macro-politics of nationalism. (shrink)

Recently, feminists have begun to draw attention to the vulnerability of human beings. This theoretical perspective lies in contrast to an element of the philosophical tradition that values autonomy and freedom. I would like, in this paper, to engage with some of the work of the feminist philosopher Pamela Anderson on the notion of vulnerability. I think that Anderson’s recognition of vulnerability is important but I’d like to suggest a different way of thinking about this issue from Pamela’s. (...) I think there are more difficulties than Anderson recognizes with Kant’s view of autonomy. Anderson argues that Kant’s theory can be adapted to cover the relationality of human beings with each other. However, I don’t think that this can be done without distorting Kant. Linked to this, she suggests that feminists ought to take into account existing “narrative identities.” However, these existing “narrative identities” may be detrimental to their interests. Subjects may be “constituted” by injurious social norms. It seems to me that there is an ontological and normative dimension of the problem that is insufficiently articulated in Pamela’s account. Kant’s view of autonomy leaves no room for vulnerability in the sense of relationality. Drawing on Simone de Beauvoir I would like to suggest a different concept of freedom and autonomy from that of Kant that allows for vulnerability. De Beauvoir argues that the freedom of each of us requires the freedom of others. Additionally I will suggest that de Beauvoir offers an account of the conditions for the removal of oppression, including the elimination of ethically detrimental aspects of vulnerability. (shrink)

What is the work ethic? Does it justify policies that promote the wealth and power of the One Percent at workers' expense? Or does it advance policies that promote workers' dignity and standing? Hijacked explores how the history of political economy has been a contest between these two ideas about whom the work ethic is supposed to serve. Today's neoliberal ideology deploys the work ethic on behalf of the One Percent. However, workers and their advocates have long used the work (...) ethic on behalf of ordinary people. By exposing the ideological roots of contemporary neoliberalism as a perversion of the seventeenth-century Protestant work ethic, Elizabeth Anderson shows how we can reclaim the original goals of the work ethic, and uplift ourselves again. Hijacked persuasively and powerfully demonstrates how ideas inspired by the work ethic informed debates among leading political economists of the past, and how these ideas can help us today. (shrink)

One of liberalism’s core commitments is to safeguarding individuals’ autonomy. And a central aspect of liberal social justice is the commitment to protecting the vulnerable. Taken together, and combined with an understanding of autonomy as an acquired set of capacities to lead one’s own life, these commitments suggest that liberal societies should be especially concerned to address vulnerabilities of individuals regarding the development and maintenance of their autonomy. In this chapter, we develop an account of what it would mean for (...) a society to take seriously the obligation to reduce individuals’ autonomy-related vulnerabilities to an acceptable minimum. In particular, we argue that standard liberal accounts underestimate the scope of this obligation because they fail to appreciate various threats to autonomy. (shrink)

La representación y la complejidad de este concepto se exponen para comprender que —como dice Gombrich— «no se representa lo que se ve, sino que se ve lo que se representa ». La identidad femenina transmitida por los medios de comunicación responde antes a la figura de la paradoja que a la de la recreación de un nuevo sujeto como procura el feminismo. Pero más complejo aún, identidades de mujeres y medios de comunicación presentan diferentes propuestas y perfiles en los (...) diversos soportes: revistas, televisión, radio, prensa, Internet. Presentarlas y destacar sus conflictos ayudará a comprender esta compleja relación entre soportes mediáticos y feminismo. (shrink)

Women as commercial baby factories, nature as an economic resource, life as one big shopping mall: This is what we get when we use the market as a common ...